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THE WAR AIMS OF THE  
UNITED STATES

A STUDY OUTLINE

BY  
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# THE WAR AIMS OF THE UNITED STATES

## A STUDY OUTLINE

The settlement after the war, whenever and however it may come is bound to be concerned with problems of fundamental importance that will, as Mr. Lloyd George has said, "settle the destiny of nations, the course of human life for God knows how many ages." Among these abstract problems will be the nature and functions of the state; the use of arbitration; the system of alliances and the groupings of the powers; the alleged rivalry of nations and the chances for a League of States; the competition of armaments and their limitation; diplomacy and its defects; the effects of absolutism and democracy upon national policies; the principle of nationality; the use of plebiscites; the value of international guarantees; the validity of treaties; possible changes in and a sanction for international law; the advisability of increasing the number of permanently neutralized states; the value of indemnities; the government of subject races by international commissions, and the relation of politics to economics and both to strategy. The application of these general principles to concrete situations will raise many questions of stupendous importance.

Already the books published on the war and its issues number thousands; only the specialist can be even partially familiar with the vast amount of material on war aims and peace terms, and for the student who desires to be informed upon the problems that will have to be solved at the settlement, some apparatus is desirable, if not necessary, to enable him to use the existing material. Magazine articles and pamphlets can deal with but single points; a few comprehensive books of great value have been published, but for a more than cursory reading, the hotly debated questions must be oriented and different views indicated.

This study outline has been prepared to meet this need. In its general plan it follows and in some cases quotes from, al-

though it is more elaborate than, those issued by the English Council for the Study of International Relations and the League of Nations Society. As would seem natural it is based upon President Wilson's programme (January 8, 1918) of the fourteen international adjustments which, in his opinion, must be considered when the settlement is arranged. After some general suggestions concerning the discussion of war aims and peace terms before victory is secured, these fourteen points are annotated.

A few books will be found of chief interest. *The War and Democracy* (Macmillan) and *International Relations* (Macmillan), by various English writers, give an admirable survey of the issues of the war. C. Ernest Fayle, *The Great Settlement* (Duffield), H. N. Brailsford, *A League of Nations* (Macmillan), A. J. Toynbee, *Nationality and the War* (Dutton) have considered most of the problems of the settlement and have written with great interest and effect. Mr. Brailsford's book is especially good and although arguing strongly for a League of Nations, does not make the blunder of American authors—for example, Goldsmith, *A League to Enforce Peace* (Macmillan)—in minimizing the severe tests to which a League will be put if it is called upon to settle existing or possible concrete questions of European politics. A great deal of valuable material is also to be found in *The New Europe* (Constable), a young English weekly review that is now being widely read. The other books and articles referred to are for the most part easily accessible. It was not intended that the opinions of the writer should appear in this study outline. If they do he alone is responsible.

*University of Virginia.*

L. R.



#### A. WAR AIMS

Before December, 1916, there was not much discussion of peace. War aims had been fully presented in the diplomatic correspondence published by the belligerents and in the speeches of statesmen who frequently took notice of what had been said by the enemy (*e.g.*, von Bethmann-Hollweg, April 5, 1916, Mr. Asquith, April 10, 1916, *Current History*, May, 1916, pp. 228, 231, and von Bethmann-Hollweg, November 9, 1916, *Current History*, February, 1917, p. 867). These documents and speeches are readily accessible in a variety of forms.

There were, of course, many rumors, semi-official "feelers," and individual discussions of peace. On the first anniversary of the war the Pope issued an appeal to the belligerents, but it was little more than an eulogy of peace in the abstract (*Current History*, September, 1915, p. 1022); in his submarine note of May 4, 1916, von Jagow, German Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, said:

The German Government, conscious of Germany's strength, twice [December 9, 1915, April 5, 1916 ?] within the last few months announced before the world its readiness to make peace on terms safeguarding Germany's vital interests, thus indicating that it is not Germany's fault if peace is still withheld from the nations of Europe. (Note of May 4, 1916, *Current History*, June 1916, p. 455.)

and on May 27th, speaking to the League to Enforce Peace President Wilson made a formal statement of his willingness to mediate:

If it should ever be our privilege to suggest or initiate a movement for peace among the nations now at war, I am sure that the people of the United States would wish their Government to move along these lines:

*First.* Such a settlement with regard to their immediate interests as the belligerents may agree upon. We have nothing material of any kind to ask for ourselves, and are quite aware that we are in no sense or degree parties to the present quarrel. Our interest is only in peace and its future guarantees.

*Second.* A universal association of the nations to maintain the inviolate security of the highway of the seas for the common and unhindered use of all the nations of the world, and to prevent any war, begun either contrary to treaty covenants or without warning and full submission of the causes to the opinion of the world—a virtual guarantee of territorial integrity and political independence. (*Current History*, July, 1916, p. 736).

Mr. Wilson had previously made a formal offer of mediation (August 5, 1914) that was courteously declined. In September, 1914, Ambassador Gerard reported to President Wilson the views of the Imperial Chancellor, von Bethmann-Hollweg, that

Germany was appreciative of the American Government's interest and offer of services in trying to make peace

but that in view of the treaty pledging the Allies against any separate cessation of hostilities,

The United States ought to get proposals of peace from the Allies. Germany could accept only a lasting peace, one that would make her people secure against future attacks. To accept mediation now would be interpreted by the Allies as a sign of weakness on the part of Germany and would be misunderstood by the German people, who, having made great sacrifices, had the right to demand guarantees of security. (*Current History*, December, 1914, p. 273).

But so far as ever disclosed the overtures had no more definite result.

The real discussion of peace terms began with Germany's offer of December 12, 1916, the Allied reply to it, and the interchanges over President Wilson's note of December 18, 1916, calling for a statement of war aims. These communications are published in *Current History*, in *International Conciliation*, Nos. 110 and 111, and with supplementary documents by the Division of International Law of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (*Official Communications and Speeches Relating to Peace Proposals, 1916-1917*. Pamphlet No. 23). President Wilson's address to the Senate on January 22, 1917 and his address to Congress (February 3) on the breaking of diplomatic relations will be found in this last named collection, while the armed neutrality address (February 26), that of April 2 asking for a declaration of war, the Flag Day Address

(June 14), and the communications to Russia in May and June have either been issued by the Committee on Public Information, or are in *Current History*. (See also, 'The Entry of the United States', *International Conciliation*, No. 114). The Pope's peace proposal and the replies are printed in *International Conciliation* No. 119. During the year, of course, there were a number of important speeches by British and French statesmen.

In December, 1917, there began another important "peace offensive" brought about by the negotiations with Russia; the declaration of British Labor's War Aims (December 28); Mr. Lloyd George's speech (January 5); President Wilson's message to Congress (January 8); the replies of Count Hertling and Count Czernin (January 24); the President's rejoinder addressed principally to Austria (February 11), and Mr. Lloyd George's and Mr. Asquith's speeches the next day. This enumeration does not include such important communications as those of President Eliot or Lord Lansdowne's letters to the *Daily Telegraph*. All of these can be found in *Current History*. See also, *International Conciliation*, Nos. 122 and 123.

## B. WHY DISCUSS WAR AIMS?

An argument for a full disclosure of the purposes for which armaments will be used is to be found in Norman Angell's *The Dangers of Half-Preparedness* (Putnam, 1916); and the best case for a diplomatic as well as a military offensive is made out in Mr. Angell's last book, *War Aims: The Need for a Parliament of the Allies* (Headley Bros., 1917) some of which appeared in *The New Republic* and the argument of which is substantially similar to the position taken editorially by *The New Republic* and *The Nation* (London).

Mr. Angell says:

The recommendations of the Paris Conference constitute an admission that, however complete our military victory, Germany will remain a great potential military, political, and economic factor in international relations.

Have we, then, any clear picture of the conditions which we are trying to establish? Does the "destruction of Prussian Militarism" mean that Germany is to have no army as well as no navy? If she is to have an army, is its size to bear some relation to the size of other armies? If so, what is to be the ratio? And, when we demand the destruction of her military forces, are we to offer Germany no guarantee against outrageous demand, or attacks upon her by other Powers?

Until we have some notion, at least, of these things, we cannot pretend to know what the destruction of German Militarism means . . . .

The announcement of a plan of guarantees by a new Paris Conference, which would truly represent all the great nations of the world, outside of Germany and Austria, if made during the war, would be a powerful, perhaps determining, factor in undermining the military resistance of the German people to the aims of the Allies, since it would make it apparent that those aims offer the best security for the rights and existence of the Germans themselves; and such an announcement would constitute the best means of aiding a revolt of German sentiment against militarist philosophy and German Militarism. (Angell, *War Aims*, pp. 55, 118-119.)

As illustrating Mr. Angell's contentions, the following incident may be cited:

On December 14, Mr. Lloyd George in an address at Gray's Inn, made a strong speech in which little was said about any war aims except victory. Count Hertling, the Imperial Chancellor, immediately granted an interview to the Wolff Bureau, the German semi-official news agency, in which he declared:

In his last speech Mr. Lloyd George calls us criminals and bandits. As it has already once been declared in the Reichstag, we do not intend to join in this renewal of the customs of the Homeric heroes. Modern wars are not won by invective, but are rather, perhaps, prolonged, *because after this abuse by the English Prime Minister it is out of the question for us to negotiate with men of such temper . . .*

Just over a year has passed since we and our Allies offered the enemy the hand of peace. It was rejected. Meanwhile our reply to the Papal Note has again set forth our standpoint. At this moment when I have just received news that the truce which already existed between us and our Eastern neighbors has passed into a formal armistice, the speech of the British Prime Minister is before me. It is the answer of the present British Cabinet to the Papal Note. Our way in the West is accordingly clear. (*London Times* [weekly edition], December 21, 1917.)

A view contrary to that of Mr. Angell:

The truth is that all discussion of war aims, in advance of the salvation of the world from the German menace, amounts merely to words. If Germany wins the war, her aims will prevail and we know what they are. The Bolsheviki, who have long thundered against Allied war aims, have reduced Russia to impotence only to discover that Germany demands of them all the Russian territory she has conquered by force of arms during the war, and a mortgage on the economic future of Russia in addition. Those who are seeking to promote the same disorder in Allied nations would find Germany demanding Belgium and the North of France, once France and Britain were weakened by internal dissensions.

When real peace terms are to be made, we in the United States will be able to speak a powerful word for justice and against aggrandizements which promise not real peace but new wars. But until there is prospect of any but German terms, which we must all fight, there is no object and there is real danger in the discussion, which is encouraged and induced in no small measure by German agents all over the world. (Frank H. Simonds, 'The Fifth Campaign'. *Review of Reviews*, January, 1918.)

Is the interchange of views of statesmen in the war (very free in comparison with previous discussions) to be attributed to an acceptance of Mr. Angell's position or to a desire to secure the support of public opinion?

How far should the Allies go in stating publicly the terms that they will insist upon at the settlement?

Is there danger in inconsistency between peace terms as expressed by the Allied statesmen? (*e.g.*, President Wilson's address to Congress, February 11, 1918, on Austria and the position taken by Mr. Lloyd George?)

How far should the disclosure and discussion of peace terms be checked because it serves to divide the Allies and hearten pacifists?

Can Prussian militarism ever be finally destroyed until the German people have experienced a change of heart and have rebelled against its philosophy?

Can this change of heart come so long as the German people believe that they must fight for this philosophy in order to protect themselves, or be ready to fight in order to protect themselves after the settlement?

How far should the people through Parliamentary representatives, Socialist and Labor organizations, participate in a discussion of the settlement?

### C. THE UNITED STATES AND THE SETTLEMENT

The United States is not a party to the treaty, signed at London, September 5, 1914, pledging Great Britain, France and Russia not to conclude peace separately and promising "that when terms of peace come to be discussed no one of the Allies will demand terms of peace without the previous agreement of each of the other Allies." (See *Current History*, December 8, 1914, p. 297.) Japan later acceded to the treaty. Semi-officially it is stated that the United States looks on the Entente Powers as "co-belligerents" rather than "allies"; that there is a "gentleman's agreement" rather than a formal document.

Every one of the nations at war with Germany took up arms for some specific reason that can be briefly, if incompletely, stated: Russia to save Serbia; Italy to secure territory from Austria, partly for the latter country's breach of the terms of the Triple Alliance; Great Britain to defend Belgium and protect France; Belgium, France, and Serbia to protect themselves. The use of the submarine against merchant vessels was the one offense that served to associate the United States with the Entente nations. But as Viscount Grey has said:

Militarism stands for things that all democracies, if they wish to remain free and to be part of a world that is free, must hate. This conviction and a sense that the old barriers of the world are broken down by modern conditions, that the cause of humanity is one, and that no nation so great and free as the United States could stand aside in this crisis without sacrificing its honor and losing its soul, are—so we believe—the real motive and cause of the decision of the United States. Democracies are reluctant to take such decisions until they are attacked or until their own material interests are directly and deeply involved, and the United States did not take the decision till German action in the War made it imperative; but then they took it with a clearness, and emphasis, and a declaration of principle that will be one of the landmarks and shining examples of all human history. (The Rt. Hon.

Viscount Grey, *America and Freedom* [Preface], p. iv. [Allen & Unwin]; reprinted, *International Conciliation*, No. 120, November, 1917, p. 24.) (President Wilson's series of addresses to Congress, February 3 and 26 and April 2, 1917, should be read in this connection.)

How far did the United States, by entering the war, approve the war aims of the Allies as expressed in the replies to the German note (December, 1916) and President Wilson's note? Compare the views expressed by the Allies and Mr. Wilson.

Would the United States be justified, as a late comer into the war, owing much to England and France for keeping Germany at bay for more than two years, in using her influence against the realization of certain war aims generally said to be fundamental, *e. g.*, the return of Alsace-Lorraine to France?

How far can the United States claim the right to be consulted on war aims covered by the formula "restitution and reparation?"

How far are the war aims of the Allies inconsistent with Mr. Wilson's more recent formula (February 11, 1918)? How far is the United States bound to support readjustments which go farther than merely inaugurating a League of Nations as one form of international insurance?

Should the United States be a party to all phases of the settlement, even those that do not remotely concern her by menacing her security in the future?



#### D. PRESIDENT WILSON'S DIPLOMACY

I. President Wilson's attempt to create a rift between the German military party on the one hand and the German people and Austria-Hungary on the other is his distinctive contribution to the diplomacy of the Allies. An appeal to democratic elements in Germany is particularly made in the reply to the Pope but appears in all of Mr. Wilson's utterances on the war; the same appeal to Austria-Hungary to free herself from Prussian domination is the basis of the address to Congress asking for a declaration of war against Austria (*Current History*, January, 1918, p. 63) and the address on Count Czernin's speech (February 11, 1918; see below, *E.*) The distinction between the Germans and their government is officially echoed to some small extent in England by Mr. Balfour's phrase that Germany must either become powerless or free and by Mr. Lloyd George's recent speeches which imply that more moderate terms could be made with a democratized Germany. The various declarations of the British Labor Party are more explicit. (See President Wilson's Flag Day speech, June 14, 1917, *Current History*, July, 1917, p. 1, and the British Labor Platform, *Current History*, February, 1918, p. 200; also *International Conciliation* No. 123.)

At Buffalo (November 13, 1917), addressing the American Federation of Labor, Mr. Wilson went out of his way to pay a tribute to the German people:

I believe that the spirit of freedom can get into the hearts of Germans and find as fine a welcome there as it can find in any other hearts, but the spirit of freedom does not suit the plans of the Pan-Germans. (*Current History*, December, 1917, p. 441.)

The theoretical distinction between the German Government and the German People is sound enough, but we cannot help thinking that up to the present it has proved quite negligible in practice. Wilson is right in a sense when he says that the German people "did not choose the War." They did not choose it because, under the Bismarckian Constitution, they have no choice at all in such high matters, but they

accepted it with enthusiasm. They have given it throughout their active support. Their representatives have voted with unanimity supplies for its continuance. (*The London Times*, commenting on President Wilson's reply to the Pope; see also, Brig. Gen. F. G. Stone, 'At War with the German People', *Nineteenth Century*, August, 1917.)

Admitting the correctness of the position here taken, does it lessen the chances for success of Mr. Wilson's policy? What are the chances for the success of such a policy?

When Mr. Wilson distinguishes between the German Government and the German people is he calling attention to an actual fact or is he simply looking toward the future?

Would a Germany "free" be a lesser menace to the future peace of the world than a Germany "powerless?"

Would a Germany in which the people had an effective control over foreign policy, the army, and the navy likely be "imperialistic" or "militaristic?"

Can the Prussian military domination be utterly and finally destroyed—a frequently reiterated Entente war aim—until the German people insist upon its being destroyed?

The following books may be found of some help: Ackerman, *Germany, the Next Republic* (Doran); Fernau, *The Coming Democracy* (Dutton); Liebknecht, *Militarism* (Huebsch); Gerard, *My Four Years in Germany* (Doran); Curtin, *The Land of Deepening Shadow* (Doran); and Beer, *The English Speaking Peoples* (Macmillan), p. 129.

II. Mr. Wilson is also very largely responsible for the fact that the discussion of war aims is public, not secret. In his own phrase:

The thought of the plain people here and everywhere throughout the world, the people who enjoy privilege and have very simple and unsophisticated standards of right and wrong, is the air all Governments must henceforth breathe if they would live. It is in the full disclosing light of that thought that all policies must be conceived and executed in the midday hour of the world's life. (Address to Congress, December 4, 1917.)

How far did Mr. Wilson's note of December 22, 1916, calling for a statement of war aims from all the belligerents, strengthen

the diplomatic position of the Entente Allies and force the hand of Germany?

How far have Mr. Wilson's utterances since the United States entered the war—for example his message to Russia (May 26, 1918; *Current History*, July, p. 49)—influenced Allied diplomacy?

Are the so-called German "peace offensives"—with their use of diplomacy as the hand-maiden of military offensives—in consonance with the quotation from Mr. Wilson's December (1917) message?

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LIEBKNECHT, *Militarism* (Huebsch).

*Current History.*

*Nineteenth Century and After.*

## E. PRESIDENT WILSON'S WAR AIMS

I. *Open covenants of peace, openly arrived at, after which there shall be no private international understandings of any kind but diplomacy shall proceed always frankly and in the public view.*

Who, then, makes war? The answer is to be found in the chancelleries of Europe among the men who have too long played with human lives as pawns in a game of chess, who have become so enmeshed in formulae and the jargon of diplomacy that they have ceased to be conscious of the poignant realities with which they trifle. And thus war will continue to be made until the great masses who are the support of professional schemers and dreamers say the word which shall bring not eternal peace, for that is impossible, but a determination that war shall be fought only in a just and righteous cause. (*The London Times*, November 23, 1912).

For illustrations of how some wars have been brought about see *Cambridge Modern History*, vol. XII., chap. 16; 'Diplomatist', *Nationalism and War in the Near East* (Oxford), pp. 177, 230; Fernau, *Because I Am a German* (Dutton), p. 144; and Dickinson, *The Choice Before Us* (Dodd, Mead), p. 248.

To what extent does the quotation from *The Times* describe the true state of affairs?

How far can it be said that "secret diplomacy" is responsible for the present war?

See Ponsonby, *Democracy and Diplomacy* (Methuen); Ponsonby, 'Democracy and Publicity in Foreign Affairs' in *Towards a Lasting Settlement* (Macmillan); Neilson, *How Diplomats Make War* (Huebsch); Morel, *Ten Years of Secret Diplomacy* (Labor Press); Dickinson, 'Democratic Control of Foreign Policy', *Atlantic Monthly*, August, 1916; Bullard, 'Democracy and Diplomacy', *Atlantic Monthly*, April, 1917; Macdonell, 'Secret or Constructive Diplomacy', *Contemporary Review*, June, 1916; Brown 'Democracy and Diplomacy', *North American Review*, November, 1916; Hyndman, 'Eng-

land's Secret Diplomacy', *North American Review*, May, 1916; Turner, 'Control of Diplomacy', *The Nation* (N. Y.), June 8, 1916.

In November, 1916, Lord Robert Cecil, debating the Greek situation said:

We are perfectly conscious of the many mistakes we make, of the many deficiencies of which we are guilty, but I cannot believe that anything which waters down the responsibility of the Government is likely to improve it. We must do what we think right. We must carry on the government of the country, badly I agree, but as well as we can do it, and we cannot share that responsibility with the House of Commons or with anybody else—not during the war. That seems to me the only position we can take up.

The only English paper to comment on this was the *Manchester Guardian* which declared (November 2, 1916) that Parliament had less control than the War Committee of the French Chamber and Senate, or the Budget Committee of the Reichstag.

All that is open to Parliament is to put questions, which if they are really pertinent are likely to meet with impertinent answers; or to initiate on the Foreign Office vote a discussion which will range over every topic under the sun that can be associated with the Foreign Secretary and which is as ineffective as it is discursive. (*The New Europe*, November 9, 1916.)

I think there is in the public mind a profound illusion as to this so-called secret diplomacy. Secret diplomacy is not, as I have tried to explain, a criminal operation intended to cover up dark transactions which lead to division among mankind; it is merely the practice of ordinary beings in the ordinary course of life which they conduct to the best of their ability and under the ordinary rules governing private individuals in the doing of such work as they have got to do. It is an extension of that to the intercourse between nations and I do not believe the rules governing the two are fundamentally different, although luckily in private life we do not always have to issue subsequently Blue Books explaining and recording all the letters which have passed between controversialists, or giving all the reasons which produced unhappy differences of opinion in the domestic circle. (Mr. Balfour in the House of Commons, August 17, 1917.)

Discuss the issues raised in these quotations.

Should there be a Foreign Affairs Committee in England to hear ministers on the conduct of foreign affairs?

What are the present arrangements of European countries and the United States for treating international questions? (See text-books on government—the subject has been discussed by eminent authorities like Bagehot, Bryce, Sidgwick, etc.—and the Appendices in Ponsonby, *Democracy and Diplomacy*, giving extracts from a Parliamentary paper describing different systems of controlling international affairs—Miscellaneous, No. 5, 1912, Cd. 6102.)

Does the arrangement in the United States—*i. e.*, the concurrence of the Senate in treaties—insure that, in Mr. Wilson's phrase, "diplomacy shall proceed always frankly and in the public view?"

Cf. Corwin, *The President's Control over Foreign Relations* (Princeton University Press); Wriston, 'Presidential Special Agents in Diplomacy', *American Political Science Review*, August, 1916; President Wilson's Missions to Europe; his exchanges with Bernstorff and Germany in the submarine controversy; the negotiations preceding the acquisition of the Virgin Islands (Danish West Indies), and the Lansing-Ishii agreement.

It is against secret *policies* in which the national liability may be unlimited that the only genuine protest can be raised; for such policies are the very negative of democracy and the denial of the most fundamental of all popular rights, namely that the citizen shall know on what terms his country may ask him to lay down his life. This justification of popular control does not presuppose the publication of diplomatic negotiations. On the contrary, it rests on the assumption that the People and Parliament will know where to draw the line between necessary control in matters of principle and the equally necessary discretionary freedom of the expert in negotiation. (A. F. Whyte, *The New Europe*, August 23, 1917.)

Is this test a valid and sufficient one?

Was England's entrance into the war contrary to the principle here set forth?

Is it advisable that there be alignments according to political parties on questions of foreign politics?

How far is a more democratic diplomacy dependent upon recruiting the diplomatic service from men who are in touch with what the masses in their country are thinking and wanting?

Have improved means of communication made this consideration of less importance?

Is the United States with its "shirt sleeve" diplomacy the superior of England in this respect?

See MacNeill, *Parliament and Foreign Policy* (Council for the Study of International Relations); *The Foreign Office and the Foreign Service Abroad* (*Ibid.*); Satow, *A Guide to Diplomatic Practice* (Longmans); Ponsonby, *Democracy and Diplomacy*; and especially, A. F. Whyte, 'A Note on Diplomacy', *The New Europe*, May 3, 1917 and succeeding discussions in this journal of a new school for diplomats.

And so it was with something like stupefaction that they [the English people] discovered, one day in August, that they were called upon to honour the obligations contracted in their name. (*The War and Democracy*, p. 3.)

Was the surprise referred to a proof that the Government of the United Kingdom was undemocratic or a proof that the great mass of people had overlooked a duty of citizenship by neglecting the study of foreign relations?

Was anyone who had made a study of British foreign policy (from materials accessible to all) surprised at the British Government's taking the course it did in July and August, 1914?

That the people of Europe have, in fact, even in countries otherwise democratic, no control over foreign policy will hardly be disputed. But the question remains, how does this come about? In detail, the answer will be different in different countries, according to the details of constitutional machinery and parliamentary procedure. But one fundamental fact applies generally. The people in no country have cared to know or control. In England, and no doubt in other countries, it is plainly true that the advent of democracy has meant, so far, not more but less interest in foreign policy.

But, after all, in the English system any matter can be made public and brought under control, if the people are determined to do it. And in England it must be admitted that, if this has not been done, it is because the people have not cared to do it. A Foreign Secretary would have had to give information, if it had been made clear that otherwise there would be a vote of censure. And improvements in the machinery of our parliamentary government, useful and necessary as they may be, will not ensure democratic control unless the people are determined to have it. Will they be determined? I cannot say. But after the

experience of this war, it does not seem likely that they will revert to the illusion that foreign policy does not concern them. (Dickinson, *The Choice Before Us*, pp. 243-244.)

Do you agree with this estimate that an increase in education is more important than an improvement in machinery, at least so far as England is concerned?

See Sir Gilbert Murray, 'Democratic Control of Foreign Policy', *Contemporary Review*, February, 1916 (also chapter VI in his *Faith, War, and Policy* (Houghton, Mifflin); *The War and Democracy*, chapters I and VI, and Rogers, 'Popular Control of Foreign Policy', *Sewanee Review*, October, 1916 (also published at The Hague by the Central Organization for a Durable Peace in *Recueil des Rapports de l'Organisation Centrale pour une Paix durable*).

How do you account for the fact that the American people are less interested in foreign politics than in domestic problems? What is the remedy?

Can public opinion influence foreign policy more effectively in the United States than in France or England?

Should a statesman, like the British Prime Minister or the President of the United States act

- (a) as he thinks the public at the moment wishes the country to act, or
- (b) as he thinks the public would wish the country to act if they knew and took into account all the facts of the situation in his possession, or
- (c) as he thinks himself the country ought to act?

What course do you think President Wilson has followed?

Are any modifications in our treaty-making arrangements or administration of the President's power over foreign affairs necessary in order to have a more popular control over foreign policy?

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II. *Absolute freedom of navigation upon the seas, outside territorial waters, alike in peace and in war, except as the seas may be closed in whole or in part by international action for the enforcement of international covenants.*

The "freedom of the seas" has apparently given Germany great concern. It is stressed by von Bethman-Hollweg in his speech of November 9, 1916; it is included in the proposals for peace communicated to American newspapers, April 18, 1915 by Dr. Bernhard Dernburg: "The world is one interlocking family of nations. World dominion is possible only with dominion on high seas. All the seas and narrows must be neutralized permanently by common and effective agreement guaranteed by the Powers." (*Toward an Enduring Peace*, p. 134.)

Exactly what does Germany mean by her insistence on the "freedom of the seas?"

Would Germany herself consider at the settlement that anything could be done to make the seas freer in time of peace than they were at the beginning of the war?

Is it true that the discussion about freedom of the seas narrows to the question of restriction on trade between belligerents and neutrals in time of war?

"Freedom of the seas" figured prominently in the exchanges between the United States and Germany over the submarine; President Wilson referred to it several times in addresses while the United States was a neutral:

If the United States were permitted to initiate or assist in a movement for peace it would urge "a universal association of the nations to maintain the inviolate security of the highway of the seas for the common and unhindered use of all the nations of the world . . . ." (At a banquet of the League to Enforce Peace, May 22, 1916.)

And the paths of the sea must alike in law and in fact be free. The freedom of the seas is the *sine qua non* of peace, equality, and coöperation. No doubt a somewhat radical reconsideration of many of the rules of international practice hitherto thought to be established may be necessary in order to make the seas indeed free and common in practically all circumstances for the use of mankind, but the motive for such changes is convincing and compelling. There can be no trust or intimacy between the peoples of the world without them. The free, constant, unthreatened intercourse of nations is an essential part of the process of peace and development. It need not be difficult either to define or to secure the freedom of the seas if the governments of the world sincerely desire to come to an agreement concerning it.

It is a problem closely connected with the limitation of naval armaments and the coöperation of the navies of the world in keeping the seas at once free and safe. (Address to the Senate, January 22, 1917.)

What is the connection between the freedom of the seas as advocated by Mr. Wilson and the position of the United States that private property should be immune from naval capture?

(Cf. Mr. Wilson's proposal and the suggestion of the Central Organization for a Durable Peace that "to facilitate the reduction of naval armaments the right of capture will be abolished and the freedom of the sea assured." For the 'Minimum Programme' of the Central Organization, see Woolf, *The Framework of a Lasting Peace* [Allen & Unwin], p. 63, and Andrews, 'The Central Organization for a Durable Peace', *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, July, 1916, p. 16.)

As the United States has for many years advocated the exemption of all private property not contraband of war from hostile treatment, you are authorized to propose to the Conference the principle of ex-

tending to strictly private property at sea the immunity from destruction or capture by belligerent powers which such property already enjoys on land as worthy of being incorporated in the permanent law of civilized nations. (Instructions to the American delegates to the First Hague Peace Conference.)

For the efforts of the United States in support of this proposal, before 1899 and at the Hague Conferences, and for the policy of such a departure as affecting the interests of the United States and Great Britain, see 'Cosmos', *The Basis of Durable Peace* (Scribner), p. 29 ff.; Scott, *The Two Hague Peace Conferences*, (Johns Hopkins Press), vol. I., Chapter XV; Holls, *The Peace Conference at the Hague* (Macmillan), pp. 306-321; Moore, *Digest of International Law* (Government Printing Office), vol. VII, Sec. 1198; Barclay, *Problems of International Practice and Diplomacy* (Boston Book Co.), pp. 63-70, 172-179; Choate, 'Immunity from Capture of Unoffending Property of the Enemy upon the High Seas', *American Addresses at the Second Hague Peace Conference* (Ginn) pp. 1-25, (also published as a pamphlet of the World Peace Foundation, February-March, 1914); Hirst, 'The Capture and Destruction of Commerce at Sea', *International Conciliation*, November, 1910; Mahan, *Armaments and Arbitration* (Harper) and *The Interest of America in Sea Power* (Little, Brown).

For a statement of the readiness of the British Government to consider proposals looking toward the immunity of private property from capture, see Sir Edward Grey's remarks in the House of Commons, April 1, 1913 and May 6, 1914.

How far was the Declaration of London a partial expression of the policy?

For authorities see Bentwick, *The Declaration of London*, and Scott, 'The Declaration of London of February 26, 1909,' *American Journal of International Law*, April and July, 1914.

To what extent is it fair to accuse England of having used her naval supremacy in a way corresponding to Germany's "mailed fist?" (e. g. in the Napoleonic Wars and at the time of the blockade of the Confederate ports during the American Civil War.)

See Egerton, *British Foreign Policy in Europe* (Macmillan); Piggott, *The Neutral Merchant* (University of London Press). For the restrictions by England on neutral trade in the present

war, see Clapp, *Economic Aspects of the War* (Yale); Phillipson, *International Law and the Great War* (Dutton); numerous editorials and articles in the *American Journal of International Law*; Corbett, *The League of Peace and a Free Sea* (Doran).

Mr. Wilson's reference to "freedom of the seas" is to be welcomed on the ground of its lucidity and breadth of definition . . . No other formula that we have seen meets so fully the stipulations that an island Power like Great Britain is bound to make to insure its own safety and that of the Empire in time of war. It seems to be a natural corollary of a League of Nations that freedom of navigation must be denied any nation that violates international covenants for the maintenance of peace. (British Labor Manifesto endorsing Mr. Wilson's address, January 9, 1918.)

Would Mr. Wilson want Great Britain and the United States to relinquish their control of the sea without its being handed over to a League of Nations?

On the handling of naval power by a League of Nations see Angell, *The World's Highway* (Doran); Sidebotham, 'The Freedom of the Seas' in *Towards a Lasting Settlement* and *Atlantic Monthly*, August, 1916; Brailsford, *A League of Nations* (Macmillan).

A blockade of the North Sea ought not to be regarded as legitimate. Those who desire the freedom of the seas must insist that there is some sea-power in existence which can effectively limit England's sole supremacy. Therefore, it is of the first importance for us that there should be no hindrance to the strengthening of our fleet. We used to say before the war that our fleet could protect our oversea trade and possessions. This task it has not fulfilled in the present war but we see the need to protect our coasts and provide a secure base for our submarines. The submarine weapon must not be struck out of our hand. It is the most effective help in war against a superior sea power, and the increased risks and uncertainties that it involves are well calculated to prevent the outbreak of war. The submarine is the warship of the small Power. So long as England maintains her supremacy it is indispensable to us. (*Europäische Staats und Wirtschaftszeitung*, June 2, 1917, quoted in *The New Europe*, August 9, 1917.)

Must measures be taken as part of the settlement to confine the use of the submarine to war vessels alone?

Can there ever be freedom of the seas while the submarine is used against commerce?

Would it be proper for a League of Nations to use the submarine against merchant vessels?

See Minor, 'The Rule of Law Which Should Govern the Conduct of Submarines with Reference to Enemy and Neutral Merchant Vessels and the Conduct of Such Vessels Toward Submarines', *Proceedings of the American Society of International Law*, 1916; Rogers, *America's Case against Germany* (Dutton) and authorities there cited; and Bellot, 'The Submarine Menace', *Contemporary Review*, August, 1917.

It would, however, be highly important for the freedom of shipping in the future if strongly fortified naval bases or important international trade routes, such as England has at Gibraltar, Malta, Aden, Hong-kong, the Falkland Islands and many other places, were removed. (Count Hertling, January 24, 1918).

Discuss this suggestion.

The necessity for naval vessels will continue, but among the policies that will be approved in the peace conference that will follow the war there should be incorporated a provision guaranteeing an international navy to enforce international decrees. To this international navy, composed of separate naval establishments of all nations, each nation should contribute in proportion to its wealth and population, or upon some plan to insure that no nation can safely challenge the decree of the high international court . . . . It would be a lasting calamity if, when this war ends, there should linger as a burden upon a people already heavily taxed by wars a competitive programme of costly naval construction. . . . .

This country will, no doubt, take its proper place in bringing about such provisions in the peace treaties as will never again constrain any nation to adapt its naval programme to the programme of some other nation from which there is the compelling menace of possible and unprovoked attack. Such compulsion is the very negative of natural and orderly development. It means the tyranny of a programme dictated by apprehension rather than the free choice of a standard suggested by national needs and supported by national ideals. An international navy, on the contrary, will make possible such naval development as each nation deems fitting for its own people. It will also serve the "parliament of man" by providing a naval force ample enough to give validity to international decrees, and strong enough to keep inviolate the peace of the world. (From the report of the Secretary of the Navy to Congress, December, 1917.)

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III. *The removal, so far as possible, of all economic barriers and the establishment of an equality of trade conditions among all the nations consenting to the peace and associating themselves for its maintenance.*

Cf. previous utterances of Mr. Wilson:

Responsible statesmen must now everywhere see, if they never saw before, that no peace can rest securely upon political or economic restrictions meant to benefit some nations and cripple or embarrass others, upon vindictive action of any sort or any kind of revenge or deliberate injury. (Reply to the Pope, August 27, 1917.)

It might be impossible also in such untoward circumstances [if the German people were compelled to continue to live under "ambitious

and intriguing masters"] to admit Germany to the free economic intercourse which must inevitably spring out of the other partnerships of a real peace. But there would be no aggression in that; and such a situation, inevitable because of distrust, would in the very nature of things sooner or later cure itself by processes which would assuredly set in. (Address to Congress, December 4, 1917.)

How far are these expressions of opinion incompatible with the Resolutions of the Paris Economic Conference?

For the texts of the Resolution see Hobson, *The New Protectionism* (Putnam), Appendix; *European Economic Alliances* (National Foreign Trade Council); *Congressional Record*, July 10, 1916, p. 12284; and *Current History*, August, 1916, p. 928. See also Clark, 'Shall There Be War after the War? The Economic Conference at Paris,' *American Journal of International Law*, October, 1917.

Does Mr. Wilson propose conditional economic war and say, in effect, to the German people that they will have nothing to fear if they cease to rely on the prowess of their military masters?

Did the entrance of the United States into the war cause the German people to attach more importance to the economic war after the war?

Cf. the Reichstag Resolution: "No less does the Reichstag reject all schemes which aim at creating economic isolation and enmity among nations after the war," and the German Chancellor's statement, July 19, 1917:

We must by an understanding and give and take guarantee the conditions of existence of the German Empire upon the Continent and overseas. Peace must build the foundation of a lasting reconciliation, prevent the nations from being plunged into further enmity through economic blockades, and provide a safeguard that the league in arms of our opponents does not develop into an economic offensive against us.

See Brailsford, 'The Reichstag and Economic Peace', *The Fortnightly Review*, October, 1917.

Without the existence of that vigorous industry which, after the shutting in of Germany, we converted mainly into a war industry we should long ago have lost this war. This kind of war industry, however, must, after peace, become relatively small, while millions of our fellow-countrymen will stream back into Germany from the trenches without

finding sufficient work there and, in any case, wages corresponding to the enormously increased prices of the necessities of life. Imagine, if we simultaneously had to bear the burden of taxation which must fall on every German, even the poor—for the greatest exaction from property would not be sufficient even remotely to meet it—and further, if, in spite of the fallen value of German money, we must still buy the most necessary raw materials and food supplies from abroad, notwithstanding all the political and other hindrances which the situation would produce for all! Can anyone in his heart of hearts really believe that under these circumstances, without an increase of power, without an indemnity, without security, we could avoid Germany's ruin? (Admiral Tirpitz in December, 1917, *London Weekly Times*, December 7, 1917.)

The economic weapon must in the case of Germany work in part through a grinding process of attrition, in part through a quickening among Germans of the desire for peace *and in part through an increase of their fear of the inevitable economic penalties of prolonging hostilities. It will gradually persuade them to pay a higher price for the opportunity of negotiating;* and in the end this price can be raised to any reasonable figure—any figure, that is, which does not deprive them subsequently of the essentials of national security and growth. (*The New Republic*, November 17, 1917.)

How far has this position been taken by English opinion which advocated the Paris Resolutions as a measure of reprisal? (See recent speeches of Lloyd George and the British Labor Party's memorandum on War Aims. *International Conciliation*, No. 123.)

What would have been the prospect of carrying out successfully the programme of the Paris Resolutions?

Is it possible for the Allies to accept or consider "the German invitation, so bluntly held out to them by the Chancellor, to enter into negotiations on the basis of bargaining for territory in exchange for economic concessions"?

Or are the Allied peace terms "absolute, which admit of no bargaining"?

Is it possible for the Allies to "invite the Central Powers to make peace by a certain date and threaten them with post-war economic reprisals varying in duration or intensity according to the length of their subsequent resistance?" (Quotations from 'The Economic Weapon', *The New Europe*, October 4, 1917, which answers the last question in the negative.)



Arguing for another economic conference to consider the post-war situation, *The New Europe* says, however, that "it should be made clear to the Central Powers that when they have accepted the Allied terms, including, of course, full reparation by the guilty parties for the ravages of war and acts done in violation of international law, there is no desire to penalize them further or to hinder their recuperation. Their peoples should be offered, under these conditions, a proportionate share in the controlled supplies and ensured against any legal restriction upon their legitimate trading activities at the expiration of the period of trade control. No pledge or action by Governments, of course, can give back to the German trading community the confidence of individual dealers or purchasers in the countries they have antagonized." (October 4, 1917.)

Should the protectionist movement after the war have purely an economic and not a political motive?

What attitude should be taken by Governments toward the export of capital to "backward countries"?

See Brailsford, *The War of Steel and Gold* (Bell) and *A League of Nations*, Chap. IX ('The Economics of Peace'); Lippmann, *The Stakes of Diplomacy* (Holt); and Hobson, *The New Protectionism* (Putnam), *Towards International Government* (Allen and Unwin), and 'The Open Door' in *Towards a Lasting Settlement* (Macmillan).

Is Mr. Wilson's proposal consistent with the programme of the League to Enforce Peace providing for the joint use of economic and military force?

What are some of the difficulties of using a boycott as a substitute for war?

What would be your own feeling if an international boycott were applied to the United States, in a case in which you believed the United States to be in the right?

What measure could be taken to prevent a boycotted country from taking up arms and precipitating the appeal to arms which the boycott is proposed to prevent?

Do you share the view of the importance of selfish economic motives in politics that underlies such suggestions as the boycott as a means of preventing war?

Are your own political actions motivated exclusively, or chiefly, by considerations of private economic interest?

What are the possibilities of an international commission charged with the supervision of international economic questions arising out of the war?

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IV. *Adequate guarantees given and taken that national armaments will be reduced to the lowest point consistent with domestic safety.*

Count Hertling in his speech of January 24, 1918, declared that "The idea of limitation of armaments is entirely discussable. The financial position of all European States after the war might most effectively promote a satisfactory solution." Count von Bernstorff in December, 1916, said that "it is Germany's desire, if the belligerents should enter upon a discussion of peace, to confer upon the question of the limitation of armaments. The Ambassador adds that in view of the German Government, a lasting peace can be accomplished only by reducing the armaments of Europe to a scale lower than that which obtained before the war. A rider is added to this statement that Germany views the international coalitions which existed before the war as objectionable, and as opposed to the maintenance of Peace." (*London Daily News*, December 16, 1916.)

Are the difficulties in the way of limiting armaments insuperable?

What methods might be employed (*e. g.*, reduction of the term of service in national armies, naval holidays, etc.)?

Would the agreement, if arrived at, have to be under the direction of an international commission?

How far is the practicability of limiting armaments bound up with the reorganization of Europe on a just and stable basis so that mutual trust will be more and more possible?

Would you consider an attempt to limit armaments a beginning at the wrong end, an attempt to remove a symptom without effecting a cure?

Before Germany can be persuaded to agree to a limitation of armaments and honestly abide by the treaty, is it necessary to make it clear that the German people have nothing to fear from the Entente Allies?

Is a proposal for a limitation of armaments compatible with the Paris Resolutions?

Would the armaments problem solve itself if the causes of friction, the grounds of fear were as far as possible removed by the Treaty of Settlement?

See Barclay, *Problems of International Practice and Diplomacy* (Boston Book Co.), pp. 123-130; Scott, *The Two Hague Peace Conferences* (Johns Hopkins Press), pp. 654-672; Trueblood, 'The Case for the Limitation of Armaments', *American Journal of International Law*, October, 1908; Mead, *The Limitation of Armaments: The Position of the United States at the Hague Conferences* (World Peace Foundation); Mahan, *Armaments and Arbitration* (Harpers), and for the Rush-Bagot Treaty under which the United States and Canada have not armed against each other, Foster, *Limitation of Armament on the Great Lakes* (Report of the Secretary of State to the President of the United States, December, 1892, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Division of International Law, Pamphlet No. 2.)

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*V. Free, open-minded, and absolutely impartial adjustment of all colonial claims, based upon a strict observance of the principle that in determining all such questions of sovereignty the interests of the populations concerned must have equal weight with the equitable claims of the government whose title is to be determined.*

Practical realization of Mr. Wilson's principle in the realm of reality will encounter some difficulties in any case. I believe that for the present it may be left for England, which has the greatest colonial empire, to make what she will of this proposal of her ally. This point of the programme also will have to be discussed in due time, on the reconstruction of the world's colonial possessions, which we also demand absolutely. (Count Hertling, January 24, 1918).

The first official statement from England on the German colonies was not made until January 31, 1917. Previous speeches, the reply of the Allies to the December (1916) peace proposals, and Mr. Balfour's covering letter did not mention the issue. But "speaking with knowledge of full responsibility," Mr. Long, the Colonial Secretary, declared that "the German Colonies will never return to German rule. It is impossible. Our overseas empire will never tolerate any suggestion of the kind." Before this the silence on the colonial question had aroused alarm in the Dominions, and Mr. Long's pronouncement was in consonance with the changed policy on imperial matters that had been inaugurated with the new national ministry, marking as it did a new constitutional doctrine (January 31, 1917).

As to the German colonies, that is a matter which must be settled by the Great International Peace Congress. Let me point out that our critics talk as if we had annexed lands peopled by Germans, as if we had subjected the Teutonic people to British rule. When you come to settle who shall be the future trustees of these uncivilized lands, you must take into account the sentiments of the people themselves. What

confidence has been inspired in their untutored minds by the German rule of which they have had an experience. Whether they are anxious to secure the return of their former masters, or whether they would rather trust their destinies to other and juster and—may I confidently say?—gentler hands than those which have had the government of them up to the present time? The wishes, the desires, and the interests of the people of those countries must be the dominant factor in settling their future government. That is the principle upon which we are proceeding. (Mr. Lloyd George, December 20, 1917.)

General Smuts in one of his speeches described the dangers that threatened the future not only of Africa, but also of Europe. The war has shown that enormously valuable military material exists in the Black Continent. Germany plotted a grandiose but terrible scheme for a great Central African Empire embracing not only the Cameroons and the East African Colonies but also the Portuguese possessions and the Congo. The man power would be available to train a powerful black army.

"It will be a serious question," said General Smuts, "whether they are going to allow a state of affairs like that to be possible, and to become a menace not only to Africa, but perhaps to Europe itself. I hope that one of the results of this war will be some arrangement or convention among the nations interested in Central Africa by which the military training of the natives in that area will be prevented as we have prevented it in South Africa."

In this speech General Smuts did not definitely declare what position the Empire should assume with reference to the colonies at the settlement. But he did point out that there is now an open route from Egypt to the Cape, and declared it should be borne in mind at the conference that "having no danger on the Atlantic seaboard or on the Indian seaboard to our very essential communications as an Empire" was a security that could not readily be given up. (Smuts, *War-Time Speeches*, [Doran] pp. 81-83.)

How far should the United States have a voice in determining the future of the German colonies?

If the use of them as "pawns" violated Mr. Wilson's principle should the latter prevail?

Dr. Seton-Watson has pointed out that there are great dangers in a policy that would insist upon the retention of the German colonies, for it would justify Germany's naval expansion. Germany's sea trade,

the argument runs, existed only by the sufferance of the British navy. "If, as a result of the war, we take from her all that we can, we shall ingrain this point of view in every German. We shall thus tend to perpetuate the old situation, with its intolerable competitive armaments." (R. W. Seton-Watson, 'The Issues of the War', *The War and Democracy*, p. 243.) As to New Guinea, Samoa, and German Southwest Africa, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa will have to be consulted. "It is only in the case of German colonies which border upon British Crown colonies (e. g., Togoland, Cameroonia, or East Africa) that the decision will rest entirely with the European governments. At this stage [1915] it would be absurd to suggest even the bare outlines of a settlement; but it is well to emphasize the fact that it involves not only the United Kingdom but the Dominions, and that on its solution depends the future development of the British Empire. In other words, the war can only result in the downfall of the Empire or in the achievement of Imperial Federation and a further democratization of the Central Government" (pp. 243-244).

See 'The Future of the German Colonies', Johnston, 'The Case for Retention', and Dawson, 'The Case for Conditional Return', *Contemporary Review*, September, 1917; Bond, 'The Conquest of the Cameroonia', *Contemporary Review*, May, 1916.

The British Labor Party in its Memorandum on War Aims, adopted December 28, 1917, urged that "all the present colonies of the European Powers in tropical Africa should be transferred to the Super-National Authority and administered as a single independent African State with its own trained staff." In its message to the Russian people issued on January 15th, the Labor Party said "that the peace conference would be well-advised to place all tropical Africa under uniform international control."

Would it be wise to scrap existing administrations that work well, as in Nigeria and Uganda, for example, and to attempt untried international administration? (H. G. Wells, 'The African Riddle', *The New Republic*, February 23, 1918; 'The Resettlement of Africa', *New York Evening Post*, February 13, 1918.)

Would it be possible to reenact the Berlin Convention (1884-1885; for the 'General Act' see the *American Journal of International Law* [Supplement], pp. 7-25) to declare freedom of trade, free access for all traders to ports and rivers, neutrality in the event of a European War, limitation of armaments and

military training to the necessities of police, and to have national administration supervised by an international commission as is suggested for the Dardanelles?

What would have been the possibilities of such an arrangement (*i. e.*, a treaty with an organization to enforce it) when the Berlin Convention was violated by King Leopold?

Can the value of Germany's colonies as "pawns" be ignored?

Would it be dangerous to leave Germany without any colonial outlet?

Can the "self-determination" principle be applied in the African colonies? Would the world have confidence in the decision of the chiefs? (See 'The Settlement of Africa', *London Nation*, January 19, 1918.)

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VI. *The evacuation of all Russian territory and such a settlement of all questions affecting Russia as will secure the best and freest coöperation of the other nations of the world in obtaining for her an unhampered and unembarrassed opportunity for the independent determination of her own political development and national policy and assure her of a sincere welcome into the society of free nations under institutions of her own choosing; and, more than a welcome, assistance also of every kind that she may need and may herself desire. The treatment accorded Russia by her sister nations in the months to come will be the acid test of their good-will, of their comprehension of her needs as distinguished from their own interests, and of their intelligent and unselfish sympathy.*

(The situation in Russia is so chaotic that only a few references and questions will be ventured.)

How far is the United States morally bound to accept this as one of its war aims?

Is the policy of the Entente Allies partly to blame for the Russian *debacle*, i. e., in not making a more definite and non-imperialistic statement of war aims? (See Brailsford, 'By Grace of Allied Policy', *The New Republic*, January 19, 1918.)

For an excellent outline of Russian history and contemporary conditions, see *The Round Table*, December, 1914. Other books of interest are *Russian Realities and Problems* (Cambridge University Press); Mavor, *Economic History of Russia* (Dutton, 2 vols.); Williams, *Russia of the Russians* (Scribner); Vinogradoff, *Self-Government in Russia* (Holt); Trotsky, *The Bolsheviki and Peace* (Boni & Liveright); Sands, 'The Ukrainians (Ruthenians) and the War', *Contemporary Review*, March, 1916; Vinogradoff, *Russia, the Psychology of a Nation* (Oxford Pamphlets).

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VII. *Belgium, the whole world will agree, must be evacuated and restored, without any attempt to limit the sovereignty which she enjoys in common with all other free nations. No other single act will serve as this will serve to restore confidence among the nations in the laws which they have themselves set and determined for the government of their relations with one another. Without this healing act the whole structure and validity of international law is forever impaired.*

The first requirement, therefore, always put forward by the British Government and their allies, has been the complete restoration, political, territorial, and economic, of the independence of Belgium and such



reparation as can be made for the devastation of its towns and provinces.  
. . . It is no more and no less than an insistence that before there can be any hope for stable peace, this great breach of the public law of Europe must be repudiated and so far as possible repaired.

Reparation means recognition. Unless international right is recognized by insistence on payment for injury, done in defiance of its canons, it can never be a reality. (Mr. Lloyd George, January 5, 1918.)

My predecessor in office repeatedly declared that at no time did the annexation of Belgium to Germany form a point in the programme of German policy. The Belgian question belongs to those questions the details of which are to be settled by negotiation at the peace conference.

So long as our opponents have not unreservedly taken the standpoint that the integrity of the Allies' territory can offer the only possible basis of peace discussion, I must adhere to the standpoint hitherto always adopted and refuse the removal in advance of the Belgium affair from the entire discussion. (Count Hertling, January 24, 1918.) But for the views of von Bethmann-Hollweg, see Gerard, *My Four Years in Germany* (Doran); and for the attitude of the Six Industrial Associations of Germany, which desire Belgium to "be subjected to the German Imperial Legislation, both in military and tariff matters, as well as in regard to currency, banking, and post," see Headlam, *The Issue* (Houghton, Mifflin).

For the history, government, and present economic development of Belgium, see Ensor, *Belgium* (Holt: Home University Library); Ogg, *The Governments of Europe* (Macmillan), Chap. XXIX, and articles in the *Encyclopedia Britannica*.

When Mr. Wilson says that there must be no attempt to limit Belgium's sovereignty, does he mean that it is out of the question to agree to neutralization again? or simply that Germany must retain no control over her?

Is the restoration of Belgium a war aim more (a) because it is due the Belgians for their heroic resistance? (b) because Germany cannot be permitted, as a measure of safety on the part of the Entente Powers, to retain control over her? (c) or because only by restoration can public right be enthroned as the guiding principle among states?

See Davis, *What Europe Owes to Belgium* (Oxford Pamphlets) and Fisher, *The Value of Small States* (Oxford Pamphlets).

Should Belgium and Luxemburg be joined? (See Destrée, 'Belgium and Luxemburg', *The New Europe*, July 12, 1917.)

Have respect for treaties and the habit of observing them and international law increased or decreased since 1839? (See Wright, 'The Legal Nature of Treaties', *American Journal of International Law*, July, 1916.)

Does Germany's conduct toward Belgium raise a doubt as to whether the present rulers of Germany can ever be trusted to keep a treaty unless convenient to them?

To have accepted mediation in 1914 would have been for a German Chancellor a notable act of grace: to refuse it if a League of Peace is constituted would be a startling act of perfidy. It requires no excessive exercise of faith to assume that public opinion, if all the Great Powers were pledged to adopt this pacific procedure before resorting to arms, would be in each country sufficiently enlightened to insist upon it, and to condemn as the aggressors the statesmen who broke the compact. (Brailsford, *A League of Nations*, p. 57.)

Would the adhesion of America to a League of Nations contribute to the establishment of conditions that would prevent a power from breaking treaties at its convenience?

What would have been Germany's probable attitude in August, 1914, if the United States had been bound to support Belgium?

There are a number of excellent discussions of the legal status of Belgium at the outbreak of the war: Stowell, *The Diplomacy of the War of 1914* (Houghton, Mifflin); de Visscher, *Belgium's Case: A Juridical Inquiry* (Doran); Baty and Morgan, *War, Its Conduct and Legal Results* (Dutton); Waxweiler, *Belgium, Neutral and Loyal* (Putnam); Phillipson, *International Law and the Great War* (Dutton); Renault, *The First Violations of International Law* (Longmans); Labberton, *Belgium and Germany* (Open Court); Fuehr, *The Neutrality of Belgium* (Funk & Wagnalls); Neilson, *How Diplomats Make War* (Huebsch); Garner, 'Some Questions of International Law in the European War: The Violation of Neutral Territory', *American Journal of International Law*, January, 1915; *International Conciliation*, January, 1915.

For the obligation on the United States to protest, see, among many authorities, Harvey, 'The Government and the War', *North American Review*, May, 1915; Rogers, 'Presi-

dent Wilson's Neutrality: An American View', *Contemporary Review*, May, 1915; Roosevelt, *America and the World War* (Scribner); 'Mr. Roosevelt's After Thought', *The New Republic*, March 25, 1916; 'The Hague Conventions and the Neutrality of Belgium and Luxemburg', *American Journal of International Law*, October, 1915; and a most thoughtful paper by Professor de Visscher, 'De la Belligérance dans ses Rapports avec la Violation de la Neutralité', in *Problems of the War*, Vol. II, p. 93 (Grotius Society Papers, 1916).

For Germany's violations of law in Belgium, see, among many authorities, Toynbee, *The German Terror in Belgium* (Doran) and Garner, 'Some Questions of International Law in the European War', *American Journal of International Law*, January, 1915. January and July, 1917.

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VIII. *All French territory should be freed and the invaded portions restored, and the wrong done to France by Prussia in 1871 in the matter of Alsace-Lorraine which has unsettled the peace of the world for nearly fifty years, should be righted in order that peace may once more be made secure in the interest of all.*

We mean to stand by the French democracy to the death in the demand they make for a reconsideration of the great wrong of 1871, when, without any regard to the wishes of the population, two French provinces were torn from the side of France and incorporated in the German Empire. This sore has poisoned the peace of Europe for half a century, and, until it is cured, healthy conditions will not have been restored. There can be no better illustration of the folly and wickedness of using a transient military success to violate national right. (Mr. Lloyd George, January 4, 1918.)

Do these declarations mean that Alsace-Lorraine must be restored to France or simply that the problem will be settled so that the peace of the world will no longer be disturbed?

How far is the United States obligated to support France in her demands for the unconditional return of Alsace-Lorraine?

On the general problem, see Putnam, *Alsace and Lorraine, from Caesar to Kaiser*, 58 B. C. to 1871 A. D. (Putnam); Hazen, *Alsace-Lorraine under German Rule* (Holt); Grant, 'France and Alsace-Lorraine', *The Political Quarterly*, May, 1915; Toynbee, *Nationality and the War* (Dutton), pp. 40-48 (which argues for a plebiscite); 'Cosmos', *The Basis of Durable Peace* (Scribner), Chap. VII; Cawcroft, 'The Problem of Alsace-Lorraine; Is There a Democratic Solution?' *The World Court*, January, 1918; Blumenthal, *Alsace-Lorraine* (Putnam); von Bülow, *Imperial Germany* (Dodd); Gibbons, *The New Map of Europe* (Century); Stoddard, *Present Day Europe, Its National States of Mind* (Century); von Mach, *Germany's Point of View* (McClurg); Lauzanne, 'Why France Wants Alsace-Lorraine', *World's Work*, February, 1918; Whyte, 'The Lost Provinces: Alsace-Lorraine', *The New Europe*, November 16, 1916; Holdich, 'New Political Boundaries in Europe: Alsace-Lorraine', *The New Europe*, February 8, 1917; Eccles, *Alsace-Lorraine* (Oxford Pamphlets).

For special stress on the natural resources of Alsace-Lorraine see Gregory, 'Geology and Strategy', *Contemporary Review*, December, 1915; Gardner, 'Lorraine, the Test of Victory', *World's Work*, January, 1918; and Brooks, 'The Real Problem of Alsace-Lorraine', *North American Review*, November, 1917.

From 1871 till 1911, Alsace-Lorraine was governed as a direct appanage of the Imperial Crown; in the latter year it received a constitution, but nothing even remotely resembling self-government. Contrary to the expectation of most Germans, the two provinces have not become German in sentiment; indeed the unconciliatory methods of Prussia have steadily increased their estrangement, despite their share in the commercial prosperity of the Empire. Those who know intimately the undercurrent of feeling in Alsace-Lorraine are unanimous in asserting that if before last July an impartial plebiscite, without fear of the consequences, could have been taken among the inhabitants, an overwhelming majority would have voted for reunion with France. But having once been the battleground of the two nations and living in permanent dread of a repetition of the tragedy, the leaders of political thought in Alsace-Lorraine favored a less drastic solution. They knew that Germany would not relinquish her hold nor France renounce her aspirations without another armed struggle; but they believed that the grant of real autonomy within the Empire, such as would place them on an equal footing with Württemberg or Baden, would render their position tolerable, and by removing the chief source of friction between France and Germany, create the ground work for more cordial and lasting relations between Germany and the two Western Powers. (Dr. R. W. Seton-Watson in *The War and Democracy*, pp. 244-246.)

For the status of Alsace-Lorraine in the German Empire see Lowell, *Governments and Parties in Continental Europe* (Harvard University Press), or Ogg, *The Governments of Europe* (Macmillan).

"What we have gained by arms in six months we shall have to defend by arms for fifty years," said General von Moltke after the Franco-Prussian War. Prince von Bülow's opinion (*Imperial Germany*, p. 69) was as follows: "The irreconcilability of France is a factor that we must reckon with in our political calculations. It seems to be weakness to entertain the hope of a real and sincere reconciliation with France, so long as we have no intention of giving up Alsace-Lorraine. And there is no such intention in Germany."

How far would these considerations apply in the case of a forcible re-annexation by France?

Would the unconditional return of Alsace-Lorraine to France be inconsistent with Mr. Wilson's principle regarding the self-determination of free peoples?

Would this principle require that Alsace-Lorraine be allowed, "under the protection of the super-national authority or League of Nations freely to decide what shall be their future political position"? ('Memorandum on War Aims of the British Labor Party'. *International Conciliation*, No. 123.)

What would be the difficulties of a referendum in Alsace-Lorraine?

Assuming that it could not be conducted under French or German auspices, would an international commission be able to secure a free decision?

Would people sent in by Germany be permitted to vote and would the plebiscite be delayed until the return of the exiles to France and elsewhere?

Would either France or Germany peaceably accept an adverse decision?

See Toynbee, *Nationality and the War*, p. 40.

Alsace-Lorraine falls into three well-marked areas:

(1) Western Lorraine (the Metz region) is Catholic and French by choice, and language, but it contains only fifteen per cent. of the total population of the Reichsland. (2) Northeastern Lorraine, on the other hand, is mainly German and Protestant, and, together with the north-west district of Alsace, would certainly prefer to be German. (3) About the real opinion of the greater part of Alsace, German by race, Catholic by religion, but with a persistent French tradition, no one can dogmatize. (Brailsford, *A League of Nations*, pp. 115-125.)

Would the proposed plebiscite have to give these districts an opportunity to decide for themselves?

Should the fact that economic resources do not follow the lines of popular feeling be taken into consideration?

Would it be possible to neutralize Alsace-Lorraine under a guarantee of the powers or under an international commission? Or simply to give it independence? Or to form it into a federation with Belgium that would make a stretch of neutralized territory from the North Sea to Italy?

Cf. the status of Savoy, a neutralized province of France, and the cession of the Ionian Islands to Greece in 1864. See *Cambridge Modern History*, Vol. XI, p. 642; Lawrence, *Principles of International Law* (Heath), Secs. 246-248, and Fayle, *The Great Settlement* (Duffield), pp. 148-153.

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IX. *A readjustment of the frontiers of Italy should be effected along clearly recognizable lines of nationality.*

What influence has the quarrel with the Papacy had upon Italy's political development?

What are the problems that the South of Italy presents?

Why did Italy join the Triple Alliance?

Why did she leave it?

Consider the justification (suggesting any modifications that seem good) of the Italian claim to control both shores of the Adriatic, from the point of view (a) of nationality, (b) of strategic security, and (c) of the future peace of the world.

On Italian history, see King and Okey, *Italy of Today* (Nisbet); Seton-Watson, *The Balkans, Italy and the Adriatic* (Nisbet); Coolidge, *The Origins of the Triple Alliance* (Scribner); Wallace, *Greater Italy* (Scribner).

The terms of the Triple Alliance have not been published but Articles I, III, IV, and VII are given in the second *Austro-Hungarian Red Book* as follows:

Article I. The High Contracting Parties mutually promise peace and friendship, and shall not enter into any alliance or engagement directed against any one of their respective States.

They bind themselves to proceed to negotiations on such political and economic questions of a general nature as may arise; and, moreover, promise their mutual support within the scope of their own interests.

Article III. If one or two of the High Contracting Parties should be attacked without direct provocation on their part, and be engaged in war with two or several great Powers not signatory to this Treaty, the *casus foederis* shall apply simultaneously to all the High Contracting Parties.

Article IV. In the event that a Great Power not signatory to this Treaty should menace the safety of the States of one of the High Contracting Parties, and that the menaced Party should be forced to make war on that Power, the two others bind themselves to observe toward their ally a benevolent neutrality. Each one of them in that case reserves to herself the right to participate in the war, if she should consider it appropriate to make common cause with her Ally.

Article VII. Austria-Hungary and Italy, being desirous solely that the territorial status quo in the near East be maintained as much as possible, pledge themselves to exert their influence to prevent all territorial modification which may prove detrimental to one or the other of the Powers signatory to this Treaty. To that end they shall communicate to one another all such information as may be suitable for their mutual enlightenment, concerning their own dispositions as well as those of other Powers.

Should, however, the status quo in the regions of the Balkans, or of the Turkish Coasts and islands in the Adriatic and Aegean Seas, in the course of events become impossible; and should Austria-Hungary or Italy be placed under the necessity, either by the action of a third Power or otherwise, to modify that status quo by a temporary or per-



manent occupation on their part, such occupation shall take place only after a previous agreement has been made between the two Powers, based on the principle of reciprocal compensation for all advantages, territorial or otherwise, which either of them may obtain beyond the present status quo, a compensation which shall satisfy the legitimate interests and aspirations of both Parties. (*Austro-Hungarian Red Book* [No. 2], Appendix, Nos. 1, 14, 15, 16; Scott [ed.], *Diplomatic Documents Relative to the European War*, pp. 335, 346 [Oxford].)

For Italy's refusal to stay in the Triple Alliance and her declaration of war on Austria-Hungary, see the *Austro-Hungarian Red Books*, and *Italy's Green Book* (*International Conciliation*, No. 93, August, 1915) which will be found in Scott's edition of the diplomatic correspondence. See also Feiling, *Italian Policy since 1870* (Oxford Pamphlets); Hope, *Why Italy is with the Allies* (Clay); 'Civis Italicus', *Italy and the Jugo-Slav Peoples* (Council for the Study of International Relations); Rigano, *The War and the Settlement: An Italian View* (Council for the Study of International Relations).

A secret treaty between Italy, Russia, Great Britain, and France signed on May 9, 1915, two weeks before Italy's entrance into the war, promises Italy territorial compensation for her military assistance. The Treaty was among the secret engagements made public by the Bolsheviki and a translation was published by *The New Europe* (See *Current History*, March, 1918, p. 494; the treaties also appeared in the *New York Evening Post*, January 25, 26 and 28, 1918).

Would the changes contemplated by this treaty be more than "a readjustment of the frontiers of Italy . . . along clearly recognizable lines of nationality"?

See Toynbee, *Nationality and the War* (Dutton), Chap. V; Gibbons, *The New Map of Europe* (Century), Chap. VII, XIII; Gibbons, *The Reconstruction of Poland and the Near East*, Chap. IV; Taylor, *The Future of the Southern Slavs*, Chap. IV, esp. pp. 150-160; Dominian, 'The Nationality Map of Europe', *A League of Nations*, December, 1917 (World Peace Foundation); Murri, 'Italy and England', *Contemporary Review*, November, 1915; 'O. de L.', 'Albania, Austria, Italy, Essad', *Contemporary Review*, August, 1917; and the provisions of the secret treaty.

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X. *The peoples of Austria-Hungary, whose place among the nations we wish to see safeguarded and assured, should be accorded the freest opportunity of autonomous development.*

What constitutes a nation? Are "race" and "nationality" different? (See *The War and Democracy*, Chap. II.)

What constitutes a state?

Is the British Empire a state or many states, or both? Which is the German Empire? The Austro-Hungarian Empire?

What holds a state together? How is it that the Austro-Hungarian state can induce Southern Slavs and Italians to fight against the Allies who include in their alliance Serbia and Montenegro and Italy?

What is the relative importance of the following factors of political cohesion: common nationality, loyalty to a dynasty (*e. g.*, in Prussia), economic convenience (*e. g.*, Austria-Hungary), geographical unity (*e. g.*, Switzerland)?

Should each nationality form a separate sovereign state? or are the claims of nationality adequately met by "home rule" in some sort of federal framework? See *The War and Democ-*

racy; Toynbee, *Nationality and the War*; Fayle, *The Great Settlement*; Brailsford, *A League of Nations*, Chap. IV; and Dominian, *The Frontiers of Language and Nationality in Europe* (Holt).

Consider the problems raised by the fact that members of different races are at present united under the Austrian Empire. Consider the relative advantages and disadvantages of dismemberment as compared with federation (a) from the point of view of nationality, (b) in relation to the formation of a League of Nations after the war.

See Steed, *The Hapsburg Monarchy* (Constable); Seton-Watson, *Racial Problems in Hungary, Corruption and Reform in Hungary, The Southern Slav Question* (Constable); Gibbons, *The New Map of Europe* (Century); Beaven, *Austrian Policy Since 1867* (Oxford Pamphlets).

What is your explanation of the survival of the Austrian Empire?

How far is the continued control by Germany of Austria-Hungary and the oppression of subject races essential to "Mittel-Europa"?

See Naumann, *Central Europe* (Knopf); Chéradame, *Pan-Germany: The Disease and the Cure* (Atlantic Monthly Press); Brailsford, 'The Shaping of Mid-Europe', *Contemporary Review*, March, 1916; Pergler, 'Should Austria-Hungary Exist?', *Yale Review*, January, 1918.

Do you think that Mr. Wilson's professions of friendship for Austria-Hungary (see his messages of December 4, 1917, and February 11, 1918) will wean Austria-Hungary from Germany and make her willing to consent to recognize subject nationalities?

What would be the probable result if Austria-Hungary acted in accordance with the following principles (Mr. Wilson's address of February 11, 1918):

*First*, that each part of the final settlement must be based upon the essential justice of that particular case and upon such adjustments as are most likely to bring a peace that will be permanent;

*Second*, that peoples and provinces are not to be bartered about from sovereignty to sovereignty as if they were mere chattels and pawns in a game, even the great game, now forever discredited, of the balance of power; but that

*Third*, every territorial settlement involved in this war must be made in the interest and for the benefit of the populations concerned, and not as part of any mere adjustment or compromise of claims amongst rival states, and

*Fourth*, that all well defined national aspirations shall be accorded the utmost satisfaction that can be accorded them without introducing new or perpetuating old elements of discord and antagonism that would be likely in time to break the peace of Europe, and consequently of the world.

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XI. *Rumania, Serbia, and Montenegro should be evacuated; occupied territories restored; Serbia accorded free and secure access to the sea; and the relations of the several Balkan states to one another determined by friendly counsel along historically established lines of allegiance and nationality; and international guarantees of the political and economic independence and territorial integrity of the several Balkan states should be entered into.*

On Balkan problems generally see Buxton (Noel), *The War and the Balkans* (Allen); Seton-Watson, *The Southern Slav Question and the Hapsburg Monarchy* (Constable); Hogarth, *The Near East* (Oxford); Forbes, Mitrany, and Toynbee, *The Balkans* (Oxford); 'Diplomatist', *Nationality and War*

*in the Near East* (Oxford); Toynbee, *Nationality and the War* (Dutton); Gibbons, *The New Map of Europe* (Century); and Marriott, *The Eastern Question* (Oxford).

With particular reference to Rumania, see Washburn, 'The Tragedy of Rumania', *Atlantic Monthly*, December, 1917; Leeper, *The Justice of Rumania's Cause* (Doran); Mitrany, *Rumania: Her History and Politics* (Oxford Pamphlets); the secret memorandum made public by the Bolsheviki (*New York Evening Post*, January 25, 1918), and many important articles in *The New Europe*, some of them by the Rumanian statesman, Take Jonsescu.

On Serbia, see Chirol, *Serbia and the Serbs* (Oxford Pamphlets); Velimirovic, *Serbia's Place in Human History* (Council for the Study of International Relations); Temperley, *A History of Serbia* (Bell); Taylor, *The Future of the Southern Slavs* (Dodd, Mead).

Serbia is the route to the East . . . . It cannot be repeated too often that Serbia is the chief obstacle to those plans of political predomination from Berlin to Bagdad, which lie at the back of Germany's mind in the world-war; that her services to the common cause entitle her to be treated on a common footing with all the other allies; and that just as Serbia is the route from the West to Constantinople and Salonica so she is the route, as in Turkish days, from Eastern Europe to Vienna and Berlin. Sooner or later it will become clear, even to the man in the street, that the way to Berlin lies not through Belgium but through the Balkans and the great Hungarian plains. (Seton-Watson, *The Balkans, Italy and the Adriatic*, pp. 31-32.)

Questions suggested with particular reference to Italy and Austria-Hungary are appropriate in considering the Balkans. The circumstances surrounding the entry of Rumania, etc., into the war can be traced in *Current History* or in some more careful record like Nelson's *History of the War*, written by Colonel John Buchan (Nelson). The following general questions, however, may be profitably discussed:

1. The causes of the Crimean, Russo-Turkish, and first and second Balkan Wars.
2. The defects of the Balkan settlements of 1856, 1878, and 1913.
3. The problems of Macedonia and Albania.
4. The possibilities of a Southern Slav United Kingdom.

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XII. *The Turkish portions of the present Ottoman Empire should be assured a secure sovereignty, but the other nationalities which are now under Turkish rule should be assured an undoubted security of life and an absolutely unmolested opportunity of autonomous development, and the Dardanelles should be permanently opened as a free passage to the ships and commerce of all nations under international guarantees.*

See Toynbee, *Turkey: A Past and Future* (Doran); Urquhart, *The Eastern Question* (Oxford Pamphlets); *Turkey in Europe and Asia* (Oxford Pamphlets); Gibbons, *The Reconstruction of Poland and the Near East* (Century), Chaps. II and III.

The Entente was officially pledged by the treaties with Russia (made public by the Bolsheviki; see *The New York Evening Post*, January, 1918, and *The New Europe*, December, 1917) to drive Turkey out of Europe and to give Russia Constantinople. (See the reply of the Allies to Mr. Wilson's note, January, 1917). With the coming of the Russian revolution these im-

perialist aims were abandoned (see the speeches and documents in *Current History*) and in his address of January 5, 1918, Mr. Lloyd George declared:

While we do not challenge the maintenance of the Turkish Empire in the homelands of the Turkish race with its capital at Constantinople, the passage between the Mediterranean and the Black Sea being internationalized and neutralized, Arabia, Armenia, Mesopotamia, Syria, and Palestine, are, in our judgment, entitled to a recognition of their separate national conditions.

What would have been the probable attitude of the United States if Russia had continued to claim Constantinople?

For the suggestion that the United States might undertake the administration of the Straits, see Toynbee, *Nationality and the War* (Dutton); Woolf, *The Future of Constantinople* (Allen & Unwin); and Buxton (Noel), 'The Destiny of the Turkish Straits', *Contemporary Review*, June, 1917. For a history of previous attempts at international administration, see Woolf, *International Government* (Brentano), and for the interesting case of Shanghai, Moore, *Digest of International Law* (Government Printing Office), Vol. II, p. 648 ff.

On the whole problem of backward states see Lippmann, *The Stakes of Diplomacy* (Holt).

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XIII. *An independent Polish state should be erected which should include the territories inhabited by indisputably Polish populations, which should be assured a free and secure access*

*to the sea, and whose political and economic independence and territorial integrity should be guaranteed by international covenant.*

Illustrate from the case of the Poles the difficulties (a) strategic, (b) economic, (c) due to mixture of population, that may stand in the way of reconstructing a nationality as an independent state.

Do the Poles look upon Prussia or Russia as the deadlier enemy?

What conditions or compensations, short of extinction as a military power, would suffice to persuade Germany to give up the greater part of the Duchy of Posen to create an independent state or an autonomous unit within Russia?

Would it be possible to give an independent Poland access to the sea without violating the principle of nationality?

See Phillips, *Poland* (Holt: Home University Library); Gibbons, *The Reconstruction of Poland and the Near East* (Century); Lewinski-Corwin, *The Political History of Poland* (Polish Book Importing Co.); *The War and Democracy* (Macmillan); Fayle, *The Great Settlement* (Duffield); Toynbee, *Nationality and the War* (Dutton); Ehrlich, *Poland, Prussia and Culture* (Oxford Pamphlets); Rose, 'The Polish Problem: Past and Present', *Contemporary Review*, December, 1916.

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XIV. *A general association of nations must be formed under specific covenants for the purpose of affording mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity to great and small states alike.*

A very full bibliography on a League of Nations will be found in Goldsmith, *A League to Enforce Peace* (Macmillan). This book, however, as has been said, does not attempt to apply the principles which it easily establishes in theory to the vexing problems of mid-European politics. The student, therefore, will find of more service the following books: Brailsford, *A League of Nations* (Macmillan); Woolf, *International Government* (Brentano); Woolf, *The Framework of a Lasting Peace* (Allen and Unwin); Hobson, *Towards International Government* (Macmillan) and Dickinson, *The Choice*



*Before Us* (Dodd, Mead). Many valuable articles have appeared in the reviews. Some of these have been reprinted by the World Peace Foundation and the League to Enforce Peace. Others that may be mentioned are Macdonell, 'Armed Pacifism', *Contemporary Review*, March, 1917; Dickinson, 'A League of Nations and Its Critics', *Contemporary Review*, June, 1917. More elaborate outlines of proposed Leagues than the programme of the American organization are given by Mr. Brailsford and Mr. Woolf.

How far is it true that America does not need a League to Enforce Peace for her own protection?

Should a League of Nations be formed when the war ends or would it be better to wait until hatred between the belligerents has become less bitter?

How far do you think the various war aims outlined by Mr. Wilson, Mr. Lloyd George, British Labor, Count Hertling, the Bolsheviki, etc., should be modified (a) if in the future there are no safeguards against aggression other than those existing when the war began, or (b) if there is mutual protection by a League of Nations?

How far should sea-power be an instrument of a League of Nations? (See Norman Angell's *The World's Highway* and the references given above under freedom of the seas.)

How great is the danger that nations will make secret, re-insurance agreements with each other? Is a successful League of Nations dependent upon open diplomacy?

To what extent must a League of Peace demand from its members adherence at all times, on pain of expulsion, or some other penalty, to certain fundamental principles, such as the principle of nationality and commercial freedom, including questions of tariffs at home and in the colonies, and guarantees for fair opportunities all round over questions of export of capital, access to raw materials, etc.? This question may be discussed in connection with the more general one: To what extent should a League of Peace aim simply at preventing the outbreak of actual wars, and how far might it venture to embark upon an attempt to remove the causes of mutual hostility among its members eventually to an open breach between them?

How far should Parliaments as well as Foreign Offices be represented on the International Bodies which are to function for the League of Nations?

Germany is ready at all times to join a League of Nations and even to place herself at the head of a League which will restrain the disturber of peace. (Chancellor von Bethmann-Hollweg to the Committee of the Reichstag, November 9, 1916.)

What should be the attitude of a League of Nations towards the Central Powers?

The following quotations are from Muir, 'The Difficulties of a League of Peace', *The New Europe*, February 1, 1917:

I. The first and most obvious condition for the successful organization of a League of Peace is that *there must be no single power, or group of Powers, dominated by a single will, so strong as to be able to defy the rest of the world, and, therefore, to be tempted by the prospect of world-supremacy.*

Is this a valid condition?

Would the British Commonwealth alone, or with the United States in a union of the English-speaking peoples, be strong enough to defy the rest of the world?

Does this condition mean that Germany's "Mittel-Europa" scheme must be completely destroyed?

II. The second preliminary condition of the organization of a League of Peace is that *the political distribution of Europe and (as far as possible) of the whole world, must be drawn upon lines which promise permanence*, by being based, not on the mere accidents of conquest or dynastic inheritance, but on clear and defensible principles, on reason, and on justice.

Is this condition valid?

Should a League of Nations guarantee the *status quo* (a) except as altered by peaceful agreement? or (b) except as altered by international council? See the books by Woelf cited above and Phillips, *The Confederation of Europe* (Longmans) which discusses the Holy Alliance and is not hopeful of the success of a League of Nations.

III. Suppose these preliminary conditions to be satisfactorily met, we are faced at the outset by a difficulty which affects the membership of the League. If the nations are to have confidence in it as a means

of preserving peace, *it must include no States which cannot be trusted to fulfill the responsibilities of membership.* Every State must have reasonable ground for certainty that, if it is attacked or if any of the principles of international law are infringed, all the other members of the league will take such active steps as may be required by the league's constitution.

Is this condition valid? (See the suggestions and questions above under *B.* and *D.* and Norman Angell's *War Aims: The Need for a Parliament of the Allies* [Headley].)

Would it be safe to include in the League a government like the United States where the treaty-making authority cannot commit the country to war as a means of coercing a recalcitrant state?

Would the danger be greater than in England where the Parliament, although having no formal control over foreign policy, holds the purse strings?

IV. Assuming that some sort of League of Peace is to be established, we are next brought up against the difficulty of devising for it a system of direction. Not long since I listened to a lecture by an eminent lawyer,<sup>1</sup> in which he commended the idea of the league as a sure safeguard against war, and proved, to his own satisfaction, that, if such a league had existed in 1914, the present war would not have broken out; and, indeed, we may very readily agree that if the conditions which would make a League of Peace a practical proposal had existed in 1914 there would have been no war. Having said so much, the lecturer went on to observe: "Of course, the league must have a common executive and a general staff," and, saying that, he passed on to other topics, as if the establishment of a common executive and a general staff presented no difficulties at all. Now it is plain that the constitution of the league must depend upon the character of its component members. If they trust and understand one another, its system may be simple and unelaborate. But if, as seems to be assumed by many of its advocates, it is to include all the civilized States of the world, it will require a very carefully-worked-out system of administration: a sort of federal council of civilization.

Is this difficulty insurmountable?

How is it worked out in the schemes suggested by Mr. Woolf and Mr. Brailsford?

<sup>1</sup>Sir Frederick Pollock, whose lecture was partly published in the *Fortnightly Review*, December, 1916.

With what chances of success?

V. If or when the war ends with victory of the Allied Powers, the conditions essential for the existence of a League of Peace, as we have already defined them, will have been largely secured. But not only that; there will exist, in fact, a great League of Peace consisting of ten States, which will have held together as no alliance has ever held together before in history, which will have learnt to trust and understand one another, and which will be united in the resolve to prevent the recurrence of such a catastrophe. If they win their victory, they will be strong enough to secure peace for the future. They will include five of the seven great States of the world—the British Empire, France, Italy, Russia, and Japan—and five of the lesser States of Europe, some of which—notably Rumania and Serbia—will be much more powerful than they have ever been before. This group of States will be profoundly distrustful of their defeated foes, whose treacheries have caused them so much agony; and in order to guard against any future recrudescence of the danger, they will be anxious to maintain their well-tried and friendly coöperation, and to devise means for preventing any cleavage among them, such as might encourage their defeated enemy to raise his head again and revive his malign ambitions.

What forms will this coöperation take?

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